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The Anti-Competitive Effect of the Internal
Revenue Code on United States-Based
Multinational Corporations
I. INTRODUCTION
Events of the past few years serve as pertinent reminders that the
world situation is constantly evolving. These events not only are re-
forming and redrawing political lines, but are expanding the global mar-
ketplace. The creation of the European Community ("EC") has forced
the United States to scramble to achieve a similar structure in North
America. The reunification of Germany and the fall of communism in
general have opened up fledgling markets in Eastern Europe which are
already being targeted by multinational corporations ("MNCs") as the
next "new" business frontier.'
The magnitude and rapidity of these events leave no uncertain ques-
tion that a strong U.S. presence in the global economy is necessary in
order for the country to remain an economic power. U.S. tax policy, how-
ever, has failed to keep pace with these changes in the world marketplace.
Restrictive tax policies are make it increasingly difficult and costly for
U.S.-based MNCs to compete effectively against their major competitors.
A failure to correct basic deficiencies in U.S. tax polices will cause the
U.S. to fall behind other world economic powers in competing for a larger
share of a growing market.2
This paper is an attempt to show how provisions in the Internal Rev-
enue Code impose on U.S. MNCs costly choices and disadvantages which
are not faced by other competitors in the international marketplace. Ini-
tially, this paper examines the globalization of the world marketplace.
Next, it provides a brief introduction to international tax concepts which
are essential to a U.S. MNC's ability to compete. The paper then analyzes
certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), discussing their
anti-competitive effects and the simple solutions which would eliminate
those effects. Finally, it concludes that Congress and the I.R.S. must en-
act solutions to these problems immediately in order to maintain the in-
ternational competitive position of U.S. MNCs.
1. See, e.g., Alan Friedman, Coke Leaves No Height Unscaled: Reigning Cola King's
Global Sales Assault Aims to Conquer Even Mount Everest, FIN. POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at 39.
2. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY 25
(1991).
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II. THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
In recent years, the removal of cross-border investment controls and
foreign exchange controls have provided an environment for increased ac-
tivity by MNCs.3 The removal of many non-tax barriers to trade and in-
vestment has increased global competition and correspondingly has made
differences in the way countries tax corporate profits (one of the few re-
maining barriers to the efficient allocation of capital).4
The competitive problem of the U.S. must be viewed in this context.
As tax considerations become more of a burden on U.S. MNCs, but not
on their competitors, U.S. businesses will be unable to participate in
many of these new markets." Accordingly, the economic problems faced
by this country will be exacerbated as its corporations are denied effective
access to major new sources of income.
The U.S. is no longer the only dominant player in global markets. In
1960, of the top twenty industrial corporations as measured by sales,
eighteen were located in the U.S.' These twenty corporations also ac-
counted for over eighty-seven percent of worldwide sales.7 In 1988, the
number of such corporations located in the U.S. was halved.' Addition-
ally, the overall market share of these twenty corporations had decreased
to fifty-four percent.' During this same time period, the Pacific Rim and
Western Europe emerged as sleeping giants poised to strip the U.S. of
much of its international economic influence.
The markets in which these players compete are also undergoing fun-
damental changes. In 1987, the EC adopted the Single European Act,
which committed the EC to creating a single market beginning in 1992.10
In 1988, Canada and this government signed the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement."' Currently, negotiations are underway with Mexico to create
eventually a North American Free Trade Zone. 2 With the former Eastern
European countries now asking for membership in the EC, it is not too
difficult to envision free trade zones existing soon throughout North
America and most of Europe.
The prospect of U.S. companies losing their competitive edge as
world markets expand becomes even more alarming in light of the U.S.
economy's increasing reliance on foreign income. The value of interna-
3. Factors Affecting International Competitiveness: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of John G. Wilkins,
Director of Tax Policy for Coopers & Lybrand).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 57.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 61.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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tional trade as a percentage of corporate net income has doubled, and the
foreign affiliates' share of total U.S. corporate earnings has tripled over
the last forty years. 13
It is therefore clear that the globalization of the world economy and
the lifting of restrictions to enter these marketplaces will cause U.S. tax
policy to have a direct effect on the ability of the U.S. MNCs to compete
against foreign competitors who are not burdened by their home govern-
ment's foreign income tax system.
III. THE U.S. FOREIGN INCOME TAX SYSTEM
The present tax system evolved from a set of provisions intended to
encourage and accommodate international operations by U.S. corpora-
tions." ' Behind these provisions lay the fundamental concepts of relief
from double taxation and tax deferral. 6 The effective operation of these
concepts is the key factor in a U.S. MNC's ability to compete in foreign
markets. Should a provision fail to advance one of these intentions, as is
the case with many current provisions, a company's competitive ability
will be correspondingly impaired. 6
Because the U.S. taxes income on a worldwide basis, 7 double taxa-
tion of foreign income prevails.' 8 Without relief from this burden, invest-
ment in a foreign country can become so unprofitable that an MNC may
be forced to withdraw its operations abroad solely for tax and not busi-
ness considerations.'9 Thus, the government provides relief from double
taxation through use of the foreign tax credit.20 This practice allows in-
come taxes paid to another country to serve as a credit against current
U.S. taxes.
However, defects with the foreign tax credit system, such as the in-
13. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at E-3. Specifically, the foreign income share of
worldwide profits as a percentage of GNP has risen from 5.1% in the 1950's to 15.4% in the
1980's. Id. at 34.
14. See RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 3 (1989).
15. See JOSEPH ISENBERGH, 1 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 18-20 (1990) [hereinafter ISEN-
BERGH I].
16. See id.
17. See I.R.C. § T 61(a) (providing that "gross income means all income from
whatever source derived"). .
18. Double taxation occurs when two countries simultaneously have and exercise tax-
ing jurisdiction with respect to the income of a taxpayer. See DOERNBERG, supra note 14, at
6-7. A nation's tax jurisdiction may be based on one of two principles: territorial or per-
sonal. As all countries generally will tax income which is earned by a foreigner within their
territorial boundaries, the U.S. taxation of worldwide income will necessarily create double
taxation. See id. at 102.
19. Factors Affecting International Competitiveness: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Alan J. Lipner, Tax
Council on Tax Policy and International Competitiveness) [hereinafter Tax Council].
20. The foreign tax credit, first enacted in 1918, is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 901-908. For
an extended discussion of the mechanics of the credit see ISENBERGH I, supra note 15, at
472-81.
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come sourcing rules, prevent the system from providing relief. For exam-
ple, when faults with credit computation prevent an MNC from offsetting
its U.S. liability with taxes paid to France, the MNC will be double taxed
and thus will face a disadvantage with other foreign competitors who are
effectively assessed only by the French.
The sourcing rules of the I.R.C.2 1 therefore are arguably some of the
most important provisions affecting foreign income taxation. These rules
identify items of income and expense as derived from either domestic or
foreign sources. The distinction between sources of income is crucial, as
the U.S. will defer to the taxing jurisdiction of a foreign government and
provide relief from double payments only for income recognized as for-
eign sourced.2 The sourcing rules directly determine not only whether
relief will be available but also the amount of that relief, because the for-
eign tax credit is limited in proportion to the amount of foreign sourced
net income.2"
The second major policy which enables U.S. MNCs to compete
abroad is tax deferral. Deferral refers to the general rule that income
earned through a foreign subsidiary will not be subject to U.S. taxation
until that income is repatriated here in the form of dividends, royalties,
or interest.2" Deferral therefore results in the postponement of U.S. taxes.
Deferral of income is extremely important to most MNCs, since it is
one of the primary mechanisms which put U.S. corporations on an equal
footing with competitors from other nations who do not tax foreign earn-
ings at all or who maintain strict deferral regimes.25 Deferral enables a
U.S. corporation to compete by providing the opportunity to reinvest
100% of a subsidiary's earnings in current and/or expansion operations.
For many MNCs which cannot make continuous capital contributions to
a subsidiary, the ability to utilize untaxed unrepatriated earnings is the
only economical way operations can be conducted in foreign markets.2 6
21. The sourcing rules are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 861-865. See generally DOERNBERG,
supra note 14, at 29-55.
22. See ISENBERGH I, supra note 15, at 18.
23. An overly simplified foreign tax credit limitation would be computed as follows:
Foreign taxes paid times (foreign sourced income/world wide income). I.R.C. § T 904(a).
Thus, as the numerator is adjusted upward for an allocation of income, a greater credit
against taxes will be allowed. Conversely, allocations of expenses decrease the numerator
and the limitation amount.
24. See ISENBERGH I, supra note 15, at 20.
25. See ROBERT A. RAGLAND, TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 19-20 (1990); Fac-
tors Affecting International Competitiveness: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (statement of Allen C. Holmes, American Petro-
leum Institute) [hereinafter API Statement].
26. Letter from Louis J. Williams, Vice President EG&G, to Kenneth H. Gideon, As-
sistant Secretary Department of the Treasury (Feb. 27, 1990), available on LEXIS, Tax
Notes Int'l, File No. 90 TNI 21-39; see also Factors Affecting International Competitive-
ness: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(statement of Philip J. Loree, Chairman of the Federation of American Controlled Ship-
ping) [hereinafter FACS Statement].
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Because many corporations have used deferral for tax avoidance pur-
poses, and because its advantages may serve as an incentive to shift in-
vestment abroad from the U.S., Congress began in 1962 to enact a variety
of rules which subjected non-repatriated subsidiary earnings to current
U.S. taxation, thereby accelerating the recognition of income to share-
holders in foreign corporations and eliminating the benefits of deferral.2 7
In general, these rules were needed in order to prevent the loss of govern-
mental revenue caused by corporations operating in tax havens.2 8 How-
ever, a variety of defects in these provisions have caused a loss of deferral
for legitimate foreign operations.
As the availability of deferral is eroded and foreign operations are
currently taxed, a U.S. MNC will be at a competitive disadvantage with a
similarly situated competitor from another country who benefits from the
current use of 100% of its earnings abroad.
2 9
IV. THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
ON U.S.-BASED MNCs
The I.R.C. presently contains many provisions which fail either in
part or whole to advance the policies of double taxation relief and defer-
ral.30 As a result of these deficiencies, U.S. MNCs are forced to shoulder a
greater tax burden than their rivals, a burden which in turn impairs their
competitive ability. The following representative provisions illustrate how
simple defects in the code can lead to the erosion of a competitive posi-
tion in the global marketplace.
A. The Allocation of Interest Expense and the Denial of Double Taxa-
tion Relief
As mentioned above, the sourcing rules require the allocation of ex-
penses to income characterized as foreign sourced. When expenses are in-
creasingly allocated to this income, the foreign tax credit limitation, and
thus the amount of relief from double taxation, correspondingly de-
creases.' So long as the costs so identified are actually recognized by a
foreign country in their determination of a U.S. MNC subsidiary's taxa-
ble income, double taxation relief is not affected.
27. See generally JOSEPH ISENBERGH, 2 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 15, 19-21 (1990)
[hereinafter ISENEERGH II].
28. See id. at 2.
29. FACS Statement, supra note 26. If a U.S. MNC is currently taxed on unrepa-
triated earnings, it will be at a disadvantage as it must compete with only sixty-six percent
of its subsidiary's earnings (100% minus 34% U.S. corporate tax rate) against competitors
that have available 100% of their subsidiary's earnings for operations and expansion. Id.
30. Examples of such provisions include I.R.C. § A4 6411(a) foreign tax credit carry-
over rules; I.R.C. § A4 904(e) alternative minimum tax foreign tax credit; I.R.C. § T 263A
uniform capitalization rules applicable to foreign persons; I.R.C. § T 904(d)(3)(e) foreign
corporation look through rules; I.R.C. § T 861 expense allocation rules; I.R.C. § T 989 ex-
change rates for foreign taxes.
31. Supra note 23.
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The IRC, however, provides for the significant allocation of many
costs to foreign income in such arbitrary ways that an MNC is denied a
tax benefit for the expenditures allocated. Of these items, interest pro-
vides an appropriate example, as it is one of the largest expenses incurred
by virtually all corporations. 2
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86), allocation of interest
did not cause problems for U.S. MNCs, since the optional gross income
method allowed a corporation to determine interest expense on a com-
pany-by-company basis."3 If a subsidiary had interest cost but no foreign
assets, one hundred percent of the interest was allocated to U.S. income
and the foreign tax credit limitation was not adversely affected.
However, TRA '86 changed the regulations and required that where
there is a group of companies eligible to file a consolidated U.S. tax re-
turn, interest expense should be spread among the assets of the affiliated
group34 and not on a separate company-by-company basis as previously
provided.35 The effect of this change was to make allocation of such costs
to foreign-source income unavoidable.
Thus, under the current fungibility method,s a required dispersal of
interest expense likely will result in an allocation of expenditures not rec-
ognized by a foreign country in their own determination of a U.S. MNC's
tax liability. Those corporations therefore will effectively be denied a de-
duction for such expense in both countries.3 7
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example: 8 A group
32. Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Comments
on Proposed Regulations Under Section 861 and 864 Regarding the Allocation of Interest
Expense 3 (1991)[hereinafter AICPA].
33. See Prior Treas. Reg. T 1.861-8(e)(2)(vi).
34. I.R.C. § T 864(e)(5)(A). An affiliated group of companies is a chain of companies
connected to a common parent by stock ownership of at least eighty percent. I.R.C. § A4
1504(a). The effect of treating a group of companies as affiliated is to treat the group as if it
were one corporation. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(a).
35. See I.R.C. § T 864(e). U.S. taxpayers must now allocate interest expense to foreign
and domestic sourced income based on the relative gross value of consolidated foreign and
domestic assets. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(g) The principle of fungibility governs this
required method of allocation. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-8T(a) The principle reflects the view that
money is fungible and that there is flexibility in both obtaining and utilizing those funds. Id.
It suggests that when money is borrowed for a specific purpose, those borrowings free up
funds for use elsewhere. Thus, it is reasoned that borrowings even for a specific purpose
should be allocated among all of the assets of the borrower. See ISENBERGH I, supra note 15,
at 205-206 (1990).
36. Supra note 35.
37. The effective non-deductibility of expenses is caused by a reduction in the allowa-
ble foreign tax credit limitation. The decrease in the foreign tax credit results in the inabil-
ity of a corporation to claim a credit for all foreign taxes incurred. This causes U.S. tax
liability to increase in the same way as if deductibility was denied for the interest expense
allocated. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 79.
38. Example modified from Factors Affecting International Competitiveness: Hear-
ings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement
of Jere D. McGaffey, Chair ABA Section of Taxation) [hereinafter ABA Statement].
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of U.S. investors decide to manufacture bicycles both here and in a for-
eign country. The U.S. parent is incorporated, with assets of $10 million
and the subsidiary with assets of $5 million. The two corporations sepa-
rately borrow $500,000 at ten percent, secured by their respective assets.
Yet the interest expense is now allocated pro-rata based on relative gross
assets. Of the $50,000 interest incurred in the U.S., $16,667 is assigned to
foreign source income. Yet none of the corresponding expenses of the for-
eign subsidiary is assigned to U.S. source income because the fungibility
of interest does not extend to interest incurred by foreign subsidiaries. 39
Of the $100,000 of interest expense incurred equally here and abroad,
$66,667 is allocated to foreign source income while only $33,333 is allo-
cated to U.S. income.
The foregoing system results in an understatement of foreign income
and an overstatement of U.S. income which, once placed into the foreign
tax credit limitation calculation, creates an effective denial in this exam-
ple of $16,667 of interest expense. This regulation constitutes a competi-
tive disadvantage because an MNC is denied a tax benefit normally ac-
corded to any other entity incurring such an expense.40 The magnitude of
the disadvantage caused by present law becomes clear when it is under-
stood that a U.S. MNC effectively loses a deduction for all interest allo-
cated to foreign source income. This requirement translates into a situa-
tion in which a U.S. MNC cannot avoid paying additional current taxes in
an amount equal to thirty-four percent 4 times any interest expenses so
assigned. The additional tax has been estimated to increase the effective
rate of U.S. taxation on its MNCs by six to eleven percentage points."2
It is important to note that such an allocation will be required even
when the fungibility principle has been complied with. The premise of
fungibility insists that interest expense should be allocated among those
assets which may conceivably support the borrowing. However, where a
subsidiary of a U.S. MNC finances its activities by securing its own as-
sets, without any guarantees or assistance from other members of the af-
filiated group, affiliation of the associated interest expense to other mem-
bers of the group is still required.43 Requiring allocation under these
circumstances stands in direct conflict with this basic principle.
A U.S. MNC thus faces a disadvantage with each of its competitors.
A purely domestic rival will be able to deduct the entire $50,000 of inter-
39. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(a) sets forth the fungibility principle as it applies to
U.S. corporations. See Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(a). Foreign corporations' recognition
of interest expense is covered by Reg. T 1.882-5 where the fungibility principle is not recog-
nized. See Treas. Reg. T 1.882-5; Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(a). The non-fungibility of
interest incurred by a U.S*. owned foreign subsidiary has been severely criticized. E.g.,
AICPA supra note 32, at 1.
40. I.R.C. § T 163(a).
41. Currently the highest corporate tax rate. I.R.C. § T 11.
42. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 79 (increase based on case study examples).
43. See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.861-11T(c).
1992
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
est and therefore will pay less tax.4 ' Similarly, the U.S. subsidiary of a
foreign-based MNC can deduct the $50,000 of interest related to its activ-
ities here.4 This is true even though that corporation may have both for-
eign and U.S. assets, since the fungibility principle does not extend to
subsidiaries of foreign MNCs.4 ' Because a U.S. MNC cannot deduct
100% of its interest, the allocation rules ironically make the after-tax cost
of facilities built in the U.S. with borrowed funds more expensive for a
U.S. MNC than for a foreign one . 7
Further, MNCs based in all six of the other major industrialized na-
tions' can benefit fully from interest expense generated by borrowings on
the part of their home-country parent or its subsidiaries. 4'9 As a result,
U.S. MNCs must pay additional taxes which are not incurred by their
foreign competitors. These excess costs impair a U.S. company's ability to
compete on equal footing internationally.
The provisions diminish the U.S. corporation's ability to compete at
home as well as in foreign markets. This effect arises not only from the
increased direct tax costs previously identified, but also from the adverse
effect such additional taxes have on management decision making. In pro-
jecting a rate of return, a U.S. MNC wishing to expand U.S. facilities by
incurring debt faces a rate of return approximately one to three percent
lower5" than a domestic or foreign competitor. A U.S. MNC is therefore
left with a choice, not imposed on its rivals, of commencing a project
which will yield an uncompetitive rate of return, or funding the project
with equity funds at the expense of its owner's financial objectives5' and
its marketing position. 52
The basic solution to the problems caused by IRC § 864 is to apply
the principle of fungibility uniformly to both U.S. MNCs and their for-
44. I.R.C. § T 163(a).
45. Id.
46. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.861-9T(a) (regulation applicable only to U.S. based groups).
47. This is a major competitive disadvantage which is viewed with disdain by most
commentators. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON
THE IMPAIRMENT OF THE ABILITY OF U.S.-BASED MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES TO COMPETE IN
THE UNITED STATES RESULTING FROM THE INTEREST-EXPENSE ALLOCATION PROVISIONS 7
(1991) [hereinafter INTEREST COMMENTS].
48. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada.
49. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 79-80.
50. See INTEREST COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 3-6 (lower rate of return is a result of
lower projected net earnings due to higher tax costs).
51. Most corporate shareholders prefer debt over equity financing. Among other rea-
sons, owners will have less investment at risk and the subsequent leveraging increases the
rate of return on the existing equity investment. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS
322-4 (4th ed., 1990).
52. U.S. MNCs are at a disadvantage when they are not free to do exactly as their
competitors do. Therefore, when a domestic or foreign owned competitor finances activities
with debt, a U.S. MNC facing a loss of deductions associated with that debt is not similarly
situated. INTEREST COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 6-7.
VOL. 20:3
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
eign-based competitors.83
In a situation where the borrowings of the parent or a U.S. subsidiary
are secured by their own assets, without any guarantees by other group
members, the interest expense deriving from that debt should be allo-
cated in full to U.S. source income of the borrower and excluded from the
allocation process.54 This adjustment would be in complete compliance
with the fungibility principle, with interest assigned to the assets which
ultimately support the borrowing. Such a change would result in full de-
ductibility of the interest expense and allow an MNC to compete on
equal ground with a purely domestic corporation because all parties will
be given the same U.S. tax treatment.
The fungibility principle must also be extended to the borrowings of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. When any such subsidiary's loans are
not secured by its own assets and assistance has been provided by a U.S.
parent or subsidiary, there is no reason for treating the interest expense
as non-fungible and unallocable to U.S. source income." Indeed, if the
principle of fungibility is to be correctly observed, the interest expense
must be dispersed among all assets of the group which support the bor-
rowing. This change will decrease the incidence of double taxation since
the assignment of interest expense to U.S. income will correspondingly
increase the foreign tax credit limitation and decrease the possibility of
an effective denial of interest expense deductions. With such a correction,
a U.S. MNC will realize a tax benefit for a majority of its interest ex-
pense, pay.lower taxes, and thereby stand in a better competitive posi-
tion. Fungibility of interest must also be extended to U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign-based MNCs." As previously discussed, these MNCs are treated
in a completely different manner than their U.S. counterparts. In order to
correct that disparate treatment and bring taxation of both U.S. and for-
eign entities into line with the treatment of U.S. MNCs, interest expense
associated with borrowings not secured solely by a subsidiary's U.S. assets
should be allocated away from U.S. income and a deduction denied for
that amount of interest unconnected with U.S. assets. Such a correction is
needed because the I.R.C. directly confers a competitive advantage, on
foreign-based MNCs at the expense of domestic competitors.
B. Deferral of Income
The anti-deferral regimes of the I.R.C. also suffer from defects which
erode a U.S. MNCs ability to compete. The disadvantages imposed, how-
ever, are more severe than the denial of deductions and double tax relief.
In most cases, the loss of deferral will have far-reaching effects on an
53. This position is advanced by virtually all commentators. E.g., INTEREST COMMENTS,
supra note 47, at 6-7; Tax Council, supra note 19.
54. See INTEREST COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 6.
55. Tax Council, supra note 19; PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 117.
56. INTEREST COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 7; Tax Council, supra note 19.
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MNC, including not only the imposition of current taxes on income which
is not yet in hand, but also the placement of burdens on such fundamen-
tal decisions as how and where to conduct foreign business.
Most tax authorities agree that the premise behind the enactment of
the various anti-deferral regimes is legitimate.5 7 The regulations were in-
tended to impose current taxes on U.S. taxpayers who conduct business
abroad primarily to escape U.S. taxation .5 The provisions denying defer-
ral therefore should extend their penalizing reach only to those corpora-
tions which are engaged in tax avoidance practices. 9
In practice, however, legitimate overseas businesses are subjected to a
loss of deferral because of outdated and conflicting provisions. Of all the
anti-deferral regimes,"0 the Subpart F rules"' for Controlled Foreign Cor-
porations (CFCs) and the Passive Foreign Investment Company ("PFIC")
rules6 2 are most important, because their current defects pose the greatest
problems for the competitive position of U.S. MNCs.
1. Subpart F and the European Community
Beginning in 1992, the European Community (EC) will begin to im-
plement a plan designed to create a single market wielding $4 trillion of
economic power and a population base of 323 million people from twelve
countries. 3 Because of the removal of physical, tax and trade barriers, it
is widely anticipated that EC-based companies will reorganize their cur-
rent corporate structures within the new market in order to produce more
efficient operations which are no longer constrained by geographic
considerations.6 4
The EC Commission believes that the centralization of operations by
European companies will produce savings of between $99-122 billion, pri-
marily from more efficient procedures.6 5 This reduction in operating costs
will increase competition in the EC by enabling producers to lower prices.
Those businesses that are unable to reduce their prices as a result of inef-
ficient corporate structures will therefore be at a serious competitive
57. See, e.g., ISENBERGH I, supra note 15, at 20.
58. See generally ISENBEERGH II, supra note 27, at 16, and 19-22.
59. See ISENBERGH I, supra note 15, at 19-20.
60. There are five regimes in total: Foreign Personal Holding Companies; Subpart F;
Passive Foreign Investment Companies; Foreign Investment Companies; and Foreign Sales
Companies. See generally ISENBERGH II, supra note 27, at 1, 21, 124, 130, and 231.
61. The Subpart F rules are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 952-964.
62. The PFIC provisions are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297.
63. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993 CHANGES IN EEC LAW 1 (1989).
64. See id. at 78; and THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IMPACT OF THE U.S. TAX
LAW ON U.S.-BASED MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1992 PROPOSALS 1 (1991) [hereinafter EC Comments]. Regarding the removal of barriers, see
generally CHANCE, supra note 63, at 2-11.
65. Id. at 16. The reduction of costs is one of the three principal reasons for achieving
a single market. Id. at 13.
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disadvantage. 6
The stake of U.S. MNCs in the European market is high. Sales of
durable goods alone to EC countries in 1988 amounted to nearly $40 bil-
lion. 7 Until now there were not significant differences in the operating
structures of U.S.-based and EC-based competitors; member nations' reg-
ulations generally required a different company to sell goods in each of
the twelve different countries.6 8 The EC proposals, however, have funda-
mentally changed this picture so that in the future both U.S. and EC
competitors may obtain the benefits of efficiency by centralizing their
operations.
Significant opportunities therefore exist for U.S. MNCs in Europe,
provided that they are not inhibited or prevented from achieving the
same efficiencies as their EC counterparts. Unfortunately, U.S. tax law
creates severe impediments to the realization of such efficiencies. The
Subpart F provisions in particular force an American MNC to choose be-
tween consolidating European operations at the risk of losing tax deferral
and suffering current taxation on a subsidiary's income, or else maintain-
ing separate subsidiaries in each EC member country in order to avoid
Subpart F taxes while suffering the competitive disadvantages caused by
this kind of inefficiency. 9
The Subpart F rules require U.S. shareholders of a CFC ° to include
in current gross income their pro-rata share of Subpart .F income.7 1 The
largest category of Subpart F income, Foreign Base Company Income, 71 is
divided further into subcategories of which Foreign Base Company Sales
Income (FBCSI) is the most prevalent and important. s FBCSI income
has three characteristics: (1) a product was bought by a CFC from a re-
lated party; (2) the product was manufactured or produced in a country
other than the CFC's nation of incorporation; and (3) the product was
resold by the CFC for use or consumption outside the CFC's place of
incorporation.7 4 In other words, when a CFC purchases goods from a U.S.
parent or subsidiary and subsequently resells these goods to consumers in
66. See John J. Salmon & Fred R. Gander, Refining Subpart F to Make U.S. Firms
More Competitive After 1992, TAX NOTES INT'L, Jan. 1, 1990, at 99; CHANCE, supra note 63,
at 15, 78.
67. Salmon & Gander, supra note 66, at 99 (citing INTERNATIONAL DIVISION U.S. CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, EUROPE 1992: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS 36-7 (1989)).
68. See id. at 98.
69. See EC Comments, supra note 64, at 3; Salmon & Gander, supra note 66, at 98.
70. A foreign corporation is a CFC if U.S. shareholders own more than fifty percent of
the total combined voting power of its stock or more than half of the stock's total value.
I.R.C. § 957(a). A U.S. shareholder is a U.S. "person" who owns ten percent or more of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such foreign corporation. I.R.C. §
951(b). A wholly owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. MNC is a typical example of a CFC.
71. I.R.C. § 951(a).
72. Ernest Larkins, Commerce Through a Foreign Subsidiary, 9 INT'L TAX & BUSINESS
LAW. 69 (1991).
73. ISENBERGH II, supra note 27, at 78; DOERNBERG, supra note 14, at 175.
74. I.R.C. § 951(a).
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other countries, Subpart F FBCSI income will arise.
Consider our bicycle manufacturer again. Assume that in order to in-
crease brand-name recognition and acceptance in Europe, the parent es-
tablishes a sales subsidiary in Germany. Further, not all earnings are re-
patriated but instead are reinvested in the CFC in order to expand
operations. Income from sales within Germany would not come under
Subpart F regulation as that money does not fall within the definition of
FBCSI.75 Sales from Germany to France, however, would qualify as Sub-
part F income and potentially be subject to current taxation. Signifi-
cantly, if all the EC member nations were considered as one country for
purposes of Subpart F, there would be no tax problem.
Because of the potentially harsh consequences of Subpart F taxa-
tion,76 Congress has always provided an exception to non-CFC country
sales. Prior to TRA '86, this exception was subjective and was based on a
facts-and-circumstances test.7 7 If a U.S. MNC could establish that the re-
routing of sales was not for purposes of tax avoidance, then any income
received by the CFC from consumers in non-CFC countries would remain
untaxed until repatriated.
TRA '86 changed this policy to an objective test. Known as the "high
tax" exception, income from non-CFC country sales now will not be taxed
as FBCSI only so long as that income has been subjected to an effective
rate of foreign tax greater than ninety percent of the maximum U.S. cor-
porate rate.78 Since all EC member nations have statutory tax rates
greater than or equal to the domestic rate,79 one would expect that a U.S.
MNC could centralize its operations in one EC country and sell goods to
the other eleven members without fear of Subpart F taxation. The reality
of the situation, however, is the opposite because of uncertainties regard-
ing the application of the high tax exception.
Consider the following example.80 Our bicycle sales subsidiary earns
French net income of one million dollars each year for three years and
75. See id. and accompanying text. The exclusion of income generated by CFC coun-
try sales results from the "foreign country" exception. See infra note 87 and accompanying
text.
76. When Subpart F is triggered, a taxpayer loses the benefit of deferral because taxes
are imposed currently on income which has not been repatriated. A U.S. MNC therefore will
have to compete against a foreign competitor with only 66% of its subsidiary's earnings
rather than 100%. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. Under prior I.R.C. § 954 (b), income would not be classified as FBCSI if a taxpayer
could establish that neither (1) the creation of the foreign corporation nor (2) the transac-
tion giving rise to the income had tax avoidance as one of its significant purposes. Prior
I.R.C. § 954(b).
78. I.R.C. § 954(b).
79. Belgium 39%; Denmark 40%; France 34%; Germany 50%; Greece 46%; Ireland
40%; Italy 36%; Luxembourg 33%; the Netherlands 35%; Portugal 36%; Spain 35%; the
United Kingdom 35%. ERNST & YOUNG INTERNATIONAL, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE
(1991).
80. Example modification based on EC Comments, supra note 64, at 4.
VOL. 20:3
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
pays French taxes at the thirty-four percent statutory rate. Because the
rate abroad is greater than ninety percent of the rate here, income from
French sales is not currently taxed by the U.S.
Assume that in year four there is a three million dollar loss, which
when carried back results in a refund of the taxes paid to France in years
one through three. As the income in those years is now "effectively" un-
taxed and the Subpart F rules require immediate taxation of that income,
the U.S. parent now will have to pay over one million dollars" in current
taxes even though the French loss and the carryback have no current ef-
fect on U.S. taxes. 2 In this scenario, the Subpart F problem is caused not
because of non-CFC country sales, but because the high tax exception
failed to exempt unrepatriated earnings which had already been assessed
at a high rate.
The effective tax rate problem illustrated by this example may be
caused not only by loss carrybacks but also by any imaginable combina-
tion of differences between the timing of income or deduction recognition
for foreign and U.S. purposes. 3 Because of the uncertainties inherent in
the high tax exception, most U.S. MNCs cannot project with any accu-
racy whether income will satisfy the exception and thus be exempt from
Subpart F taxation. Consequently, to avoid the harsh effects of Subpart
F, a corporation must maintain independent subsidiaries in each of the
EC countries where it desires to market its products. 4
Ironically, Subpart F was never intended to yield such results. In
1962, Congress was primarily concerned with the increasing use of foreign
subsidiaries in low tax or no tax ("tax haven") countries.8 5 Subpart F was
designed to be a penalty which would discourage the transfer of income to
a subsidiary principally for purposes of avoiding higher U.S. assessments.
As all EC member countries are full tax jurisdictions, rather than tax
havens, it is contrary to Congressional intent for Subpart F to apply to
the European operations of a U.S. MNC.
At the time of enactment, Congress was also aware that Subpart F
81. $3 million at the 34% U.S. statutory tax rate = $1.02 million.
82. The foreign loss would have no effect on U.S. taxes since it would not be entered
into the foreign tax credit limitation computation; therefore there would be no upward ad-
justment of the credit amount. I.R.C. § 905, however, requires a readjustment of the current
year credit in order to impose current U.S. tax on the refund amount. See I.R.C. § 905(c);
EC Comments, supra note 64, at 4.
83. EC Comments, supra note 64, at 5. An example of such a "timing difference"
would be depreciation. If a foreign country provides for accelerated depreciation which ex-
ceeds the conservative Subpart F depreciation schedules, the U.S. may impose a current tax
on the difference. See Treas. Reg. T 1.964-1(c)(1)(iii)(b).
84. As the high tax exception does not guarantee the exemption of income, a taxpayer
who desires to sell products in various EC countries is left only with the "foreign country"
exception to ensure that income will not qualify as Subpart F income. Salmon & Gander,
supra note 66, at 98.
85. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-9 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 57-8 (1962). See generally ISENBERGH II, supra note 27, at 20-21.
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might impair the competitive position of companies engaged in legitimate
income-producing activities. 6 Thus, the "foreign country" exception was
created, providing that FBCSI would not include CFC country sales." It
was apparently Congress' belief that a "subsidiary's 'natural business lo-
cus' was the subsidiary's country of incorporation, and that transactions
occurring outside that country were likely motivated by U.S. tax avoid-
ance purposes."8 8
In the context of the EC, this assumption does not hold true because
a subsidiary's transactions with consumers in other EC countries will in-
volve transactions with other full-tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, because
the EC will constitute one single market, it would seem obvious that the
"natural business locus" of companies that operate in Europe will expand
to include the entire EC.s 9 Therefore, to be consistent with Congressional
intent regarding the "foreign country" exception, a CFC's "country of in-
corporation" should be considered the entire EC. It is widely believed,
however, that the I.R.C. will not adopt such a position.9 0 Thus, a U.S.
MNC is effectively relegated to use of only the high tax exception.
The present definition of FBCSI presents a difficult and costly choice
for a U.S. MNC: reorganize European operations and lose tax deferral on
EC source income, or preserve Subpart F deferral and maintain an ineffi-
cient European corporate structure. Unfortunately for American MNCs,
this is not a choice which their major competitors must face when deter-
mining how to reorganize European operations in response to the exis-
tence of a single market."'
If the choice is made to maintain separate subsidiaries in each EC
member country, U.S. MNCs will be operating at a severe disadvantage in
comparison to EC-based and Japanese-based MNCs. Precluded from cap-
86. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-9 (1962); see also EC Comments, supra
note 64, at 2-3.
87. This exception is embodied in the definition of FBCSI. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
88. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
OF U.S. INCOME TAXATION 291 (1987).
89. Salmon & Gander, supra note 66, at 101; EC Comments, supra note 64, at 3.
90. For an extended discussion of the law regarding the definition of "foreign coun-
try," which determines whether the Internal Revenue Service would have a reasonable basis
for this conclusion, see EC Comments, supra note 64, at 5-7.
91. Japan has an anti-deferral system, yet the denial of deferral extends only to a list
of countries officially recognized as tax havens. No EC countries are listed by Japan. PRICE
WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 21; EC Comments, supra note 64, at 5. Canada, France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom also maintain anti-deferral systems; however, unlike the
U.S. system, these countries do not eliminate deferral for active business income. PRICE
WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 21. Other EC countries either exempt foreign earned income
from their taxing jurisdiction altogether by unilateral action (e.g., the Netherlands) or by
treaty. EC Comments, supra note 64, at 5. As their major competitors are not exposed to
current taxation on the earnings from foreign subsidiaries, U.S. MNCs will be at a competi-
tive disadvantage whenever the I.R.C. requires current recognition of unrepatriated income.
Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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italizing on the efficiency related savings the single market will offer,
American entities will be unable to cut prices and therefore will be unable
to compete effectively, if at all."'
The simplest solution to this problem is to amend the definition of
FBCSI to include the EC as a single country.93 That amendment would
give U.S. MNCs the same options as in the European corporate reorgani-
zations enjoyed by their European and Japanese rivals. Further, this sim-
ple change would leave the high threshold in place to discourage the use
of tax havens for avoidance of U.S. taxes.
Such a change would bring the Subpart F rules back into line with
original Congressional intent. Congress intended for the. rules to discour-
age the location of subsidiaries in tax havens, yet was careful to include
the foreign country exception in order to prevent impairing the effective-
ness of a subsidiary in its "natural business locus." When enacted, the
"natural business locus," or competitive environment of a subsidiary, was
thought to be only a "foreign country."' " New realities, however, such as
creation of a single European market, suggest that redefining a "foreign
country" to include the EC would better achieve Congress' aim to protect
competitive ability of U.S. MNCs.
2. The All-Inclusive Passive Foreign Investment Company
The PFIC provisions were enacted to close a loophole in the Subpart
F rules which had allowed U.S. shareholders of foreign investment corpo-
rations to benefit from deferral of taxes on passive income which built up
in those businesses. 5
The provisions were aimed exclusively at companies such as offshore mu-
tual funds whose predominate characteristic was the production of pas-
sive income.9" As enacted, however, the PFIC provisions are so broad that
they may ensnare any corporation, from the originally targeted passive
income groups to active manufacturing or marketing subsidiaries who in-
advertently happen to fail the PFIC test.97
Unlike Subpart F, which applies only when certain ownership levels
are met, the PFIC rules apply irrespective of the degree of ownership or
control by U.S. shareholders. The IRC provides that any foreign corpora-
tion is a PFIC if, for any taxable year, either seventy-five percent or more
of its gross income is passive, or fifty percent or more of its assets would
92. See Salmon & Gander, supra note 66, at 100.
93. Such a change has nearly universal support from tax authorities to industry execu-
tives. E.g. Salmon & Gander, supra note 66, at 100; EC Comments, supra note 64, at 8; API
Statement, supra note 25.
94. EC Comments, supra note 64, at 8.
95. Tax Council, supra note 19. Passive income generally includes interest, rents, and
royalties. See I.R.C. §§ 1296(b)(1), 954(c).
96. I.R.C. §§ 1296(b)(1), 954(c); PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 2, at 161.
97. See Tax Council, supra note 19; Larkins, supra note 72, at 86-7.
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produce passive income. 9"
Once the PFIC test is satisfied, a U.S. investor is faced with a costly
choice: the shareholder may elect immediate taxation of his share of all of
the corporation's income (both passive and ordinary), or, when the share-
holder receives an extraordinarily large dividend or sells his interest at a
gain, he will have to pay regular tax and an interest penalty for the "priv-
ilege" of not being taxed on his share of the income as it was earned."9
These options are respectively known as the current inclusion and inter-
est charge regimes.
As suggested, any company potentially may qualify as a PFIC, irre-
spective of the fact that it is primarily engaged in active rather than pas-
sive business operations. Under the applicable test, gross income, not
gross revenue, is the determinative amount, a figure arrived at by sub-
tracting cost of sales. Obviously, even the most active of subsidiaries may
produce no gross income, though substantial gross revenue is generated
by active operations. Consider the following:100 Our bicycle sales subsidi-
ary generates sales revenue of $10 million but has an equal amount of
cost of sales. The subsidiary also earns $100 of interest on funds held in
its corporate account. Even though passive income is only 0.001% of over-
all gross revenue, one hundred percent of its income in that year is pas-
sive so that our predominantly active subsidiary is a "passive" company
for tax purposes.
The relevant test is too easily met, for gross revenue and cost of sales
may be equivalent in any given year as a result of a reduction in prices to
clear out slow-moving inventory, to attract a greater market share, or to
respond to a temporarily unfavorable foreign exchange rate.1 '
An active subsidiary may violate the asset test with similar ease. Two
Internal Revenue Service Notices have announced that, for purposes of
computing the amount of passive assets, cash and other assets easily con-
vertible into cash, such as inventory, will be considered passive assets
even though such holdings are an integral part of active operations. 102
Assume our subsidiary has a balance sheet as follows: cash ($5 mil-
lion); trade receivables ($30 million); inventory ($55 million); and prop-
erty and equipment ($30 million). Based on current IRS positions, our
subsidiary will qualify as a PFIC because fifty percent of its assets are
passive. Our subsidiary is a PFIC even though all of the assets are used in
98. I.R.C. § 1296(a); see generally ISENBERGH II, supra note 27, at 129-152.
99. See I.R.C. §§ 1295(a), and 1291(c); John S. Karls, PFIC/PFC Planning for Active
Foreign Subsidiaries, 2 J. INT'L TAXATION 205 (1991).
100. Example adapted from Karls, supra note 99, at 206.
101. Id.; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS ON THE COM-
PETITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-BASED MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES OF THE WRITTEN PROPOS-
ALS ON TAX SIMPLIFICATION IN THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS STAFF REPORT RELEASED JUNE
18, 1990 6 (1991) [hereinafter PFIC Comments].
102. See I.R.S. Notices 88-22, 1988-1 C.B. 489; 89-81, 1989-2 C.B. 399. See also Karls,
supra note 99, at 206.
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its active sales operations and none of the assets generate passive income.
As indicated previously, if either test is satisfied, a shareholder has a
choice of electing taxation under either a current inclusion or an interest
charge regime. Under a current inclusion regime, a shareholder will be
taxed currently on his share of all the earnings of the subsidiary, both
ordinary and passive.'03 A shareholder who elects current inclusion treat-
ment therefore subjects himself to a particularly harsh system of taxation
which results in complete elimination of deferral for all income from a
foreign subsidiary.'0 4 With an MNC which requires all of the subsidiary's
earnings to be reinvested in order to maintain or expand operations, this
option can be crippling.'0
5
The alternative is no less harsh: Under the interest charge regime, a
shareholder must pay interest as well as taxes on the deferred tax liability
from the date of qualification as a PFIC or the shareholder's purchase
date (whichever is earlier) to the date of a distribution or gain.'0 To illus-
trate the impact of this penalty, assume- the following: 0 7 The parent of
our bicycle subsidiary receives a $60 million distribution in 1992 from the
sales subsidiary which represents all of the subsidiary's earnings from
1987 through 1992. If the company qualified as a PFIC in 1988, the $60
million would be allocated equally over the years 1988 through 1992, with
interest assessed on the deferral years 1988 through 1991. Assuming an
interest rate of twelve percent, the interest liability alone would be $6.1
million. 08
Basically, the interest charge regime is designed to impose the maxi-
mum amount of interest and taxes on the electing shareholder. 109 Because
the penalty imposed by this option is so severe, it might not be an option
at all and might prevent a U.S. MNC from investing in a foreign subsidi-
103. I.R.C. § 193(a)(1)
104. See Larkins, supra note 72, at 90; ISENBERGH II, supra note 27, at 145.
105. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
106. I.R.C. § 1291 (a)(1), (c)(2)-(3).
107. Example modified from PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 4-5.
108. Id.
109. Several requirements should be noted regarding the calculation of the interest
penalty. First, the amount of the distribution is allocated equally to each deferral year,
while interest and taxes are assessed for each year irrespective of whether there was an
offsetting tax loss in any year. Karls, supra note 99, at 207-8. Second, total tax and interest
are payable even though the U.S. shareholder may have had excess tax credits in a particu-
lar year which would have offset the amount due. Id. at 209. Third, prior distributions do
not affect the allocation period. Id. at 208. Therefore, if a second distribution was made five
years later in 1997, interest and taxes would be calculated based on a 1988 through 1996
allocation period, ignoring the fact that all of the 1987 through 1992 earnings had been
distributed and taxes and interest paid. Because of longer allocation period, a higher
amount of interest and taxes is then assessed. Fourth, the required tax rate is the highest
individual or corporate rate for each year. I.R.C. § 12 9 1(c)(2). The bottom line is that inter-
est and taxes easily may exceed one hundred percent of the dividend or gain, thereby elimi-
nating any benefit from the investment. Karls, supra note 99, at 209 (extensive computa-
tions provided); PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 2.
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ary altogether.
Another harsh aspect of the PFIC provisions is that they retain their
pre-acquisition status even though they are not held to be a PFIC at the
time of purchase."10 Thus, if a subsidiary desired by an MNC has ever
qualified as a PFIC, even if solely in foreign hands at the time, that sub-
sidiary will be a PFIC in the hands of the new purchaser."'
A U.S. MNC wanting to enter a market therefore must decide to cre-
ate a new corporation to purchase a less desirable non-qualifying corpora-
tion, or to purchase the desired corporation and bear the burden of prov-
ing that it is not a PFIC. As many foreign companies do not retain the
necessary information, the latter choice may present a formidable obsta-
cle."' Any of the foregoing options, however, represents an uneconomical
barrier for a U.S. MNC to enter a new market." 3
Once the PFIC test has been met, its consequences will continue for-
ever, as a qualifying corporation permanently becomes a PFIC.' ' The
classification continues irrespective of the fact that such a status never
occurs again.
However, a U.S. shareholder does have the option of cleansing PFIC
status once the test is no longer met. Under IRC § 1297(b)(1), a share-
holder may elect to recognize all of his unrealized gain with respect to
stock investment."5 Because the calculation of unrealized gain will likely
result in a large current tax liability for the shareholder which would re-
quire an equal distribution of earnings from the subsidiary, most US in-
vestors do not make the election and are saddled with an uneconomical
investment."'
Further, the election may be made only by those shareholders who
were shareholders when PFIC status terminated."' Thus, an MNC which
desires to purchase a qualifying subsidiary is denied the right to discon-
tinue its status. Should the MNC be unable to secure the election from
the prior owners, it will be unprofitable to purchase the subsidiary, and it
will be forced to enter the market by purchasing another, possibly less
desirable corporation.
The overly broad sweep of the PFIC provisions therefore presents
severe disadvantages to U.S. MNCs that desire to conduct active business
110. I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1). See PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 3; AICPA, supra
note 32, at 9.
111. PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 3.
112. Id. at 5-6.
113. See id.
114. I.R.C. § 1291(a)(1)(B)(ii) (popularly known as the "once a PFIC always a PFIC"
rule).
115. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1297-3T(a), (b)(3); Larkins, supra note 72, at 88.
116. See Letter from Thomas M. Nee, International President, Tax Executives Insti-
tute, Inc., to Donaldson Chapoton, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (Aug. 28,
1987), available in LEXIS, Tax Notes Int'l, File No. 87 TNI 36-30.
117. Temp. Treas. Reg. T 1.1297-3T(a)(1).
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operations abroad. From the outset, a corporation's decision is burdened
by problems associated with pre-acquisition PFIC status. Further, an
MNC establishing new operations or maintaining existing operations po-
tentially may suffer a complete denial of deferral which may be necessary
to sustain ongoing activity or expansion, or may lose most of the benefit
of a subsidiary's earnings when distributed."1 These disadvantages by
themselves impair the ability of a U.S. MNC to compete internationally.
Additionally, since these disadvantages are not imposed on major foreign
rivals, the PFIC provisions can deal a devastating blow to a U.S. MNC." 9
With CFCs, the anti-competitive effects are magnified. Such corpora-
tions are already subject to an anti-deferral regime under Subpart F. 2 '
However, by violating the gross income or asset test, a CFC may also
qualify as a PFIC. The effect is that all of the CFC's income is effectively
treated as Subpart F income and denied deferral even though Subpart F
would otherwise deny deferral only for a portion of that income.2 '
Subpart F, which applies exclusively to the deferral of CFC income,
is therefore rendered inoperative by the PFIC definition. As a result, a
CFC is denied the benefit of the high tax and foreign country exception
and is taxed in a way totally unintended by Subpart F. 22 In order to
correct this defect, the PFIC provisions should be amended to exclude
CFCs. 2 This action would merely bring the PFIC provisions to the con-
dition intended when enacted - as a catchall for non-CFCs that escaped
Subpart F.12 4
U.S. MNCs do not exclusively conduct business abroad through use
of a majority or wholly owned subsidiary. 2 5 Often new markets are pene-
trated through a joint venture or other arrangement whereby U.S. owner-
ship is less than that necessary to qualify as a CFC.12 8 When a foreign
subsidiary with active business operations is not a CFC, a change in the
provisions only as to CFCs will not totally remove the disadvantages im-
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 91; PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 2.
120. Supra note 70 and accompanying text.
121. See PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 9 (quoting Letter from Ronald A. Pearl-
man, Esq., Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, to House Ways and Means
Committee (June 18, 1990)).
122. Because all income of the subsidiary, both ordinary and passive, is denied defer-
ral without exception under the PFIC provisions, the high tax and foreign country excep-
tions of Subpart F are meaningless.
123. Such p change has been called for by tax authorities and industry representatives.
See e.g. Tax Council, supra note 19; API Statement, supra note 25; Letter from Robert J.
Patrick, Jr., CEO Tax Study Group, to Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary of Tax
Policy (April 23, 1990), available in LEXIS, Tax Notes Int'l, File No. 90 TNI 21-38.
124. Supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
125. Among the various reasons why a U.S. MNC would not utilize a wholly or major-
ity owned subsidiary are host country restrictions, lack of available capital, or uncertainty
regarding the host country and its market. See DONALD T. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 2-3 (2d ed. 1984).
126. See id.. CFC (Controlled Foreign Corporation) is defined at supra note 70.
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posed by the PFIC rules. '27 Therefore, in order to remove the penalties on
subsidiaries, specific changes must be made to the PFIC provisions.
The fundamental defect with the provisions is the PFIC definition. '
As demonstrated previously, the test is too simple to meet. In particular,
the asset test is flawed. By including both cash and inventory in the defi-
nition of "passive assets," a business such as a sales subsidiary, which
generally has only inventory and cash, is especially vulnerable even
though none of its assets produce passive income.1"9 The test also inher-
ently impairs a company's competitive ability because it encourages such
unsound business practices as delaying the collection of accounts receiva-
ble to avoid having an excess amount of cash on hand and thereby meet-
ing the test for "passive assets."1 30
The solution to this problem is to exclude from the definition of pas-
sive assets cash and inventory which are necessary for active opera-
tions.13 1 This change would better measure whether assets held by a sub-
sidiary are predominantly for the production of passive income.
The gross income test is similarly flawed. Foreign subsidiaries ac-
tively engaged in businesses that happen to incur an operating loss in a
particular year should not be classified as a PFIC simply because a small
amount of passive income causes the seventy-five percent limit to be ex-
ceeded. Because a comparison between gross revenue from operations and
passive income would more accurately reflect the predominant character-
istic of the business, the test should be changed and based on gross reve-
nue instead of gross income.' 32
Finally, the pre-acquisition status of a foreign subsidiary should be
irrelevant.' 33 It makes no sense to distort an MNC's investment choice
when, at the time of purchase, the subsidiary does not qualify as a PFIC.
This change would put the burden on the purchasing MNC to avoid
PFIC classification instead of erecting barriers to an investment decision
which the MNC has had no role in creating.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing examples demonstrate the significant impact the Inter-
nal Revenue Code has on the ability of a U.S. corporation to compete
internationally. Considering that these few items are only representative
of the total number of foreign tax provisions which potentially can have
127. This is because a change only as to CFCs would not solve the problems associated
with taxation of non-CFC's active business operations which occur as a result of defects in
the PFIC provisions
128. E.g. PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 6-7.
129. Typically, since a sales subsidiary has only inventory to be sold, cash, and ac-
counts receivable, the test is particularly easy to meet for such operations.
130. See Karls, supra note 99, at 212.
131. PFIC Comments, supra note 101, at 7.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
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adverse effects on a U.S. MNC,' s4 it becomes clear that the U.S. tax sys-
tem is a great threat to U.S. corporations that desire to operate abroad.
Tax writers advance various reasons to justify their treatment of
MNCs, ranging from the need to treat U.S and foreign operations of an
MNC equally to the need to prevent the export of U.S. capital and
jobs.' 35 However, when the rhetoric is stripped away, the real reason for
the manner in which MNCs are taxed is solely revenue related."3 6 Income
from international activities represents a lucrative source for taxes which
politicians can easily target without fear of popular criticism. As foreign
income becomes a larger component of U.S. MNCs' overall earnings, the
temptation to overtax this major source of revenue will increase as well.
Throughout the fifties and sixties, when Congress enacted a large
portion of the foreign tax provisions, discrimination against MNCs and
their foreign sourced income was not a significant issue.'3 7 The economic
dominance of the U.S. in world markets led policy makers to believe that
domestic tax policy could not possibly have an effect on the country's
overall competitive ability. It was also believed that if foreign countries
had inconsistent tax policies, they would follow the U.S. lead and make
similar changes.' 38
The realities of the nineties, however, are drastically different from
those thirty years ago. Not only has the U.S. lost its dominant economic
position but the world itself has dramatically changed. The emergence of
common markets such as the EC and the dissolution of the Soviet empire
are only the beginning of events which will reshape the global stage on
which international competition will occur. Nonetheless, tax writers are
engaged in a dangerous mode of thinking. They have continued to enact
discriminatory and conflicting laws that subject U.S. MNCs to higher
rates of taxation than their competitors, operating on past beliefs rather
than present realities. All concerned must realize that such action is a
formula for future economic disaster. Even though world income is be-
coming a larger share of U.S. wealth,3 9 the country's share of interna-
tional markets is decreasing. " Thus the establishment of impediments to
competition abroad will affect U.S. growth and prosperity.' 4 '
The U.S. system of taxing the foreign income of MNCs therefore
needs to be critically reexamined, an examination that must involve a
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fundamental change of thought. The focus should shift to enhancing the
competitive ability of MNCs rather than compromising that ability solely
to maximize present federal revenue, concentrating on harmonizing U.S.
tax rules with those of our major competitors.' 42 The goal here should be
to establish a level playing field so that a U.S. MNC does not pay more
tax than a foreign MNC with respect to income earned in the same mar-
ket. Should harmonization be impossible, U.S. provisions should be re-
structured with the goals of competitiveness and simplicity in mind.'"
The economic future of the U.S. is being decided by today's policies.
It will surely be tragic if, as the markets of the world become more acces-
sible due to the removal of external barriers, our own country's tax poli-
cies become the ball and chain preventing-U.S. MNC participation. If the
I.R.C. is not reexamined and restructured now, our future prosperity may
be disappear in the wake of the competitive advantage of foreign corpora-
tions who do not have onerous burdens placed upon them by their
governments.
James Leonard
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